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Commercial Clicks: Advertising
Algorithms as Commercial Speech
Kerri A. Thompson*
ABSTRACT

Congressional hearings have finally called for the "right
regulation"of social media platforms. The FirstAmendment, however,
has shielded internet companiesfrom regulationsince the birth of social
media. Even if Congress enacts legislation now, internet companies will
be able to defend against the "wrong regulation" by claiming the
regulation unconstitutionally limits their freedom of speech. This
Article uses Facebook's advertising algorithms as a case study of how
Congress can properly regulate Facebook by analyzing the advertising
algorithms as commercial speech, which receives less protection under
First Amendment jurisprudence. In doing so, Congress can protect the
strong public interest in eliminating Facebook's unregulated ability to
indiscriminatelysell data based on any category-including"Jew hater"
and "Hitler was right," both actual categories that ProPublica
discovered in its investigation of Facebook's advertising practices in
2017-while maintaining the strong First Amendment protection of
internet companies'freedom of speech. First, this Article discusses the
need for the regulation of advertising algorithms that sell data to
advertisers.
Then, it analyzes whether Facebook's advertising
algorithms can be considered commercial speech under First
Amendment case law. It argues that the regulation of Facebook's
advertising algorithms can survive First Amendment scrutiny through
the commercial speech doctrine, and it concludes that doing so
maintains protection of Facebook as a community while regulating
Facebook as commerce.

J.D., The George Washington University Law School, 2017. The Author would like to
thank Dawn Nunziato for her insight on the First Amendment, as well as Alyx E. Eva, Erin E.
Meyers, and their colleagues at the Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law for
their thoughtful comments and editorial work on this Article.
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I. INTRODUCTION

As admitted by Mark Zuckerberg himself, the recent public
revelations of Facebook's advertising policies make government
regulation of social media advertising necessary.' The automated
advertising policies of Facebook alone have resulted in the amplification

See Ali Breland, Zuckerberg Announces Support for Regulating of Political Ads on
1.
Social Media, HILL (Apr. 6, 2018, 2:03 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/381990zuckerberg-announces-support-for-regulating-political-ads-on-social-media [https://perma.cc/
X6BS-ZSAC]; Mark Zuckerberg in His Own Words: The CNNInterview, CNN (Mar. 21, 2018, 11:35
https://money.cnn.com/2018/03/21/technology/mark-zuckerberg-cnn-interviewPM),
transcript/index.html [https://perma.cc/2S42-QFHC].
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of hate speech, 2 the dissemination of terrorist propaganda, 3 and have
even had traceable effects upon the 2016 presidential election. 4
Proposals to regulate social media have ranged from Senator
Amy Klobuchar's 2018 attempt to mandate disclosure in the event of a
data breach5 to Senator Joe Lieberman's 2008 attempt to force Google
to take down violent terrorism videos from YouTube. 6 But these, and
many other, proposals have not moved forward. Generally, the US
government has been hesitant to regulate social media.7 One reason
why is that to the extent social media companies start to resemble
media companies rather than tech companies,8 they can assert broad
2.
See Michal Lavi, Evil Nudges, 21 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 4, 15 (2018) ("Some
business models are based on nudges that enhance extreme or offensive content to attract users
and, in turn, increase advertising revenue."); Julia Angwin, Madeleine Varner & Ariana Tobin,
Facebook Enabled Advertisers to Reach 'Jew Haters, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 14, 2017, 4:00 PM)
https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-enabled-advertisers-to-reach-jew-haters
[https://perma.cc/5T7M-PEUB]. For a discussion of how social media amplifies speech generally,
see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC: DIVIDED DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA 3-4, 15-16

(2017).
3.
See Rupert Neate, Extremists Made £250,000 from Ads for UK Brands on Google, Say
Experts,
GUARDIAN
(Mar.
17,
2017,
1:30
PM)
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/mar/17/extremists-ads-uk-brands-google-wagdighoneim [https://perma.cc/JEF5-RZZWJ; Casey Newton, Facebook's First Content Moderation
Report Finds Terrorism Posts Up 73 Percent This Year, VERGE (May 15, 2018, 10:00 AM),
https://www.theverge.com/2018/5/15/1 7 3 53386/facebook-content-moderation-report-terrorismhate-speech-community-standards-spam-fake-accounts [https://perma.cc/XH48-P8HY]; see also
HOUSE OF COMMONS, HOME AFFAIRS COMM., HATE CRIME: ABUSE, HATE AND EXTREMISM ONLINE

9-12 (2017) (discussing terrorist speech in the UK context).
4.
See Honest Ads Act, S. 1989, 115th Cong. § 7 (2017); Jonathan Zittrain, Engineering
an Election, 127 HARv. L. REV. F. 335, 337 (2014) (discussing generally the impact of digital media
on voter behavior); David Ingram, Facebook to Overhaul Political Ads After Threat of U.S.
Regulation, REUTERS (Sept. 21, 2017, 2:26 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-

ceo/facebook-to-overhaul-political-ads-after-threat-of-u-s-regulation-idUSKCN 1BW2S9
[https://perma.cc/SUD6-2365]; Donie O'Sullivan & Dylan Byers, Exclusive: Fake Black Activist
Accounts Linked
to Russian Government, CNN
(Sept.
28,
2017,
11:40
PM),
https://money.cnn.com/2017/09/28/mediafblacktivist-russia-facebook-twitter/index.html
[https://perma.cc/B53M-GPUL] (identifying Russian operatives who created fake "Blacktivist"
page as part of the Kremlin's attempt to influence US elections); Alyza Sebenius, Should Facebook
Ads
Be
Regulated
Like
TV
Commercials?, ATLANTIC
(Sept.
14,
2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/09/facebook-ads-free-speechl539736/
[https://perma.cc/PVU2-7CUZ] (discussing Congress's proposal that Facebook advertisements be
regulated like television advertisements).
5.
See, e.g., Social Media Privacy Protection and Consumer Rights Act of 2018, S. 2728,
115th Cong. § 3(c)(1)(A) (2018).
6.
See Anne Broache, Senator Targets YouTube, but Law Not on His Side, CNET (May
19, 2008, 5:41 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/senator-targets-youtube-but-law-not-on-his-side/
[https://perma.ce/M96Z-7AFV].
7.
See Katy Steinmetz, Congress Never Wanted to Regulate Facebook. Until Now, TIME
(Apr. 12, 2018), http://time.com/5237432/congress-never-wanted-to-regulate-facebook-until-now/
[https://perma.cc/74C6-CDDK] (quoting Senator John Kennedy as saying, "I don't want to have to
vote to regulate Facebook . . . .").
8.
See Mary Louise Kelly, Media or Tech Company? Facebook's Profile Is Blurry, NPR
(Apr. 11, 2018, 5:59 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/04/11/601560213/media-or-tech-companyfacebooks-profile-is-blurry [https://perma.cc/F5U2-KDSU].
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First Amendment protections to limit Congress's power to restrict the
companies' speech. 9 The same First Amendment rights that protect the
New York Times, for example, would likely protect Facebook's ability to
"speak" how it sees fit. 10
Yet one can preserve social media companies' right to free speech
and still regulate these companies' ability to sell their speech and the
By analyzing advertising
speech of their users to advertisers.
algorithms under the commercial speech doctrine, courts can allow
Congress to meaningfully check social media companies by regulating
their main source of revenue" while protecting the public's interest in
privacy, safety, and free speech.
Despite the recent media coverage of the ways in which
Facebook has breached users' privacy, disseminated "fake news," and
contributed to physical violence, 12 Facebook remains largely
In fact, section 230 of the
unregulated at the federal level.
Communications Decency Act of 1996 shelters Facebook and all
providers of interactive computer services from liability based on thirdparty content posted to their sites. 13 In addition to this blanket
protection against liability from Congress, courts have also expansively
protected speech under the First Amendment, holding that search
14
engine results produced by algorithms are protected speech.
9.

See Brian Leiter, Cleaning Cyber-Cesspools: Google and Free Speech, in THE

OFFENSIVE INTERNET: SPEECH, PRIVACY, AND REPUTATION 155, 155 (Saul Levmore & Martha C.

Nussbaum eds., 2010).
See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256, 274-75 (1964); Mehmet Konar10.
Steenberg, The Needle and the Damage Done: The Pervasive Presence of Obsolete Mass Media
Audience Models in First Amendment Doctrine, 8 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 45, 59 (2005)
("[B]ecause audiences use the Internet more like a newspaper than a television-that is,
interactively rather than passively-the Internet receives essentially the same high level of First
Amendment protection as newspapers.").
See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, FACEBOOK, INC. FORM 10-K 9 (2019) (disclosing that
11.
advertising constituted 99 percent of Facebook's revenue in 2018).
See Carole Cadwalladr & Emma Graham-Harrison, Revealed: 50 Million Facebook
12.
Profiles Harvestedfor CambridgeAnalytica in Major Data Breach, GUARDIAN (Mar. 17, 2018, 6:03
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/i 7/cambridge-analytica-facebook-influencePM),
us-election [https://perma.cc/8ZQ8-J8A2] (reporting that Cambridge Analytica breached users'
privacy and Facebook's terms of service by accessing the profiles of 50 million Facebook users
without their consent); Simon Cottee, Can Facebook Really Drive Violence?, ATLANTIC (Sept. 9,
https://www.theatlantic.com/internationalarchive/2018/09/facebook-violence2018),
germany/569608/ [https://perma.cc/2VEE-LCKC] (discussing a study that claims to prove that
Facebook "makes communities more prone to racial violence"); Emily Dreyfuss, Facebook's Fight
Against Fake News Keeps Raising Questions, WIRED (July 20, 2018, 7:42 PM),
https://www.wired.com/story/facebook-fight-against-fake-news-keeps-raising-questions/
[https://perma.cc/Q5S6-BS4W].
See Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2018); DANIELLE KEATS
13.
CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 171 (2014).

See, e.g., E-ventures Worldwide, LLC v. Google, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 3d 1265, 1273-75
14.
(M.D. Fla. 2016) ("Google's PageRanks are pure opinions of the website's relevancy to a user's
search query, incapable of being proven true or false."); Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d
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This Article outlines a solution to regulate social media
advertising algorithms that will satisfy First Amendment scrutiny,
using Facebook as a case study. Part II analyzes the need for regulation
by examining how Facebook has chosen to use advertising categories
when unsupervised by any federal agency. Facebook programs its
algorithms to amass data about users' interests and preferences and
then packages that data into discrete categories to sell to advertisers.15
An advertiser can then bid for the attention of someone who might be
interested in its wares based on specific and detailed microtargeting. 16
There are few limits on how Facebook can select data to sell or which
categories it can offer. This lack of regulation has given advertisers the
ability to bid on categories based on any information Facebook collects.
In one instance uncovered by ProPublica, advertisers were even able to
target users based on their interest in violence against minority
groups. 17
Part III performs a two-step First Amendment analysis using a
functionality test and a commercial speech test, reaching two
conclusions.
First, advertising algorithms are expressive speech
covered by the First Amendment. Second, advertising algorithms are
commercial speech that can be regulated under Central Hudson's fourpart test.18 Part IV analyzes whether a proposed statutory framework
to regulate
Facebook's
advertising algorithms can survive
constitutional scrutiny, concluding that a narrowly tailored regulation
that directly advances the government interests of consumer protection
and protection from discrimination would survive scrutiny.
II. THE NEED FOR REGULATION
In September 2017, the media reported that a news organization
successfully placed advertisements in the Facebook News Feeds of
users who had demonstrated an interest in such categories as "Jew
hater," "How to burn jews," and "History of 'why Jews ruin the world."'1 9
Facebook created these advertisement categories automatically,
433, 437-39 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Kinderstart.com, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), 2007
WL 831806, at *13-15 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007) (finding Google not liable for alleged First
Amendment violation because it was not a government actor); Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F.
Supp. 2d 622, 629-30 (D. Del. 2007); Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M,
2003 WL 21464568, at *2-3 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003).
15.
See Angwin, Varner & Tobin, supra note 2.
16.

See TIM Wu, THE ATTENTION MERCHANTS: THE EPIC SCRAMBLE TO GET INSIDE OUR

HEADS 5-6 (2016).
17.
See Angwin, Varner & Tobin, supra note 2.
18.
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
19.
Angwin, Varner & Tobin, supra note 2.
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matching interested users via an algorithm. 20 Although Facebook
responded to the negative media coverage by promising to provide more
human review of its "automated processes," the company was under no
legal obligation to do so. 2 1 If Congress attempted to regulate its
advertising algorithms, Facebook could assert a First Amendment
22
defense, arguing that the algorithm is protected as "machine speech."
When a user posts in a group called "Hitler did nothing wrong"
or professes an interest in "How to burn Jews" on social media, the posts
are speech 23- just as speaking from a soap box on a sidewalk or wearing
25
This
a black armband 24 is speech-because it is an expressive act.
26
its
harms,
but
despite
extremely
harmful,
kind of speech can be
legislation would likely fail to regulate this kind of speech by Facebook
users because the US Supreme Court has held the government may not
27
restrict speech on the basis that it "expresses ideas that offend." As a
private company, Facebook itself can determine its own rules and terms

See id.; Cade Metz, How Facebook's Ad System Works, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2017),
20.
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/12/technology/how-facebook-ads-work.html
[https://perma.cc/XF58-BSYU]; Olivia Solon, Facebook Can Track Your Browsing Even After
PM),
3:17
2017,
3,
(July
GUARDIAN
Says,
Judge
Out,
Logged
You've
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jul/03/facebook-track-browsing-history-californialawsuit [https://perma.cc/J3Z6-2AJK].
21.

Angwin, Varner & Tobin, supra note 2.

22.

See Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1525-31 (2013) (outlining how

courts have given First Amendment protection to computer code).

Cf. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2002, 2012 (2015) (holding that lyrics
23.
posted to social media site are speech under the First Amendment); Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties
Union, 521 U.S. 844, 863-64, 885 (1997) (citing Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp.
824, 883 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (stating that the internet is "the most participatory form of mass speech
yet developed")).
See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504, 508 (1969)
24.
(holding that wearing black armbands to school was speech: a "silent, passive expression of
opinion").
See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 369, 376-85 (1968) (holding that draft card
25.
burning was not protected speech because the government had a sufficiently important
government interest in regulating the nonspeech element to justify the incidental limitation on
First Amendment freedoms).
See WIBKE K. TIMMERMANN, INCITEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 32-33 (2014); JAMES
26.
WALLER, BECOMING EVIL: How ORDINARY PEOPLE COMMIT GENOCIDE AND MASS KILLING 203,

246-48 (2d ed. 2007) (describing how hate speech dehumanizes and morally disengages the
speaker from a victim group).
See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017) (holding that the disparagement clause
27.
of the Lanham Act, which prohibited the registration of trademarks that may disparage any
persons, violates the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment, thus finding that the US Patent
and Trademark Office impermissibly denied a trademark to a musical group called "The Slants"
on the basis of the disparagement clause because the name of the group was a racial slur against
Asian Americans); Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 443-44, 451, 458 (2011) (holding that protestors
carrying signs that said "Thank God for Dead Soldiers" and "Fags Doom Nations" at a military
funeral were protected by the First Amendment); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377,
391 (1992).
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of use for its users, 28 and has recently made some efforts to do so
publicly. 2 9 But because these efforts have only arisen after public

scandals, 30 Mark Zuckerberg has acknowledged that it is time for the
right regulation of Facebook.3 1
The Supreme Court has long justified the broad protection of
offensive speech under the theory of the marketplace of ideas and
counterspeech. 32 The idea of counterspeech, first described by Justice
Brandeis's concurrence in Whitney v. California,is that the best remedy
for false or fallacious speech is "more speech." 33 The theory of
counterspeech has been invoked to strike down various laws that
sought to censor speech perceived to misinform or mislead, as well as
speech perceived to offend. 34 By this line of reasoning, it better serves
people's interests to become well-informed through open channels of
communication rather than seeking to protect people from the
information itself.35 The idea is related to the theory of the marketplace
of ideas, 36 first articulated by Justice Holmes's dissent in Abrams v.
United States, arguing that "the power of the thought to get itself
28.

See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735, 1737 (2017) (suggesting that

social media is a public forum); FirstAmendment-Freedom of Speech-Public Forum Doctrine-

Packingham v. North Carolina, 131 HARV. L. REV. 233, 238-42 (2017) (stating that designating
social media sites as public fora would limit Facebook's ability to censor based on content, but it is
unclear how courts will interpret the Packingham case).
29.
See
Mark
Zuckerberg,
FACEBOOK
(Apr.
3,
2018),
https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/10104771321644971 [https://perma.cc/8S2A-LYXC].
30.
See Queenie Wong, Some Facebook Fact-Checkers Aren't Sure If Their Efforts Are
Working, CNET (Dec. 13, 2018, 12:29 PM), https://www.cnet.cominews/some-facebook-factcheckers-arent-sure-if-their-efforts-are-working/ [https://perma.cc/V6TT-8CD3].
31.
See Breland, supra note 1; Laura Kayali, Facebook EmbracesRegulation - Reluctantly,
POLITICO (Jan. 29, 2019, 8:17 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/01/29/
facebook-reluctant-regulation-1130090 [https://perma.cclH7CU-P24D].
32.
See Richard Delgado & David Yun, "The Speech We Hate": FirstAmendment Totalism,
the ACLU, and the Principleof Dialogic Politics, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1281, 1281, 1289 (1995).
33.
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see also
United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 727-28 (2012) ("The remedy for speech that is false is
speech that is true.").
34.
For more on counterspeech and offensive speech, see, e.g., Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct.
1744, 1767 (2017) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (promoting counterspeech for offensive speech). For
more on counterspeech and misleading or misinforming speech, see Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 716, 72930 (striking down the Stolen Valor Act, a law that aimed to protect the "integrity and purpose" of
the Congressional Medal of Honor from deleterious false claims); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va.
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 750, 767-78, 773 (1976) (striking down a law that
banned the publication of prescription drug prices, which had a stated aim of protecting people
from being duped by lower prices at the risk of their own health).
35.
See Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 95-97 (1977) (citing
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy,425 U.S. at 770) (holding that a city ordinance banning "For Sale" signs
in an attempt to combat white flight violated the First Amendment because "people will perceive
their own best interests if only they are well enough informed, and that the best means to that end
is to open the channels of communication rather than to close them").
36.
See Philip M. Napoli, What If More Speech Is No Longer the Solution? First
Amendment Theory Meets Fake News and the FilterBubble, 70 FED. COMM. L.J. 55, 60 (2018).
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accepted in the competition of the market" will provide "the best test of
truth." 37
The theory of counterspeech is not limited to the strict
presentation of one idea and then an obligatory statement that the
opposite opinion also exists-although certain media had similar
obligations under the fairness doctrine. 38 Rather, the theory is simply
that allowing more speech to potentially counter dangerous speech is
more desirable than banning the dangerous speech. 39 Scholars delving
into why encountering diverse ideas is important to the democratic
process emphasize the difference between unplanned exposure to ideas
(i.e., "more speech" that you did not intentionally seek out) and
unwanted exposure to ideas (i.e., a reader of the left-leaning Guardian
newspaper purposefully being shown right-leaning Telegraph
newspaper articles). 4 0 Both unplanned and unwanted exposure to ideas
may be considered counterspeech alternatives to censorship.
While offensive speech may be protected4 ' and algorithms may
be speech, 42 algorithms that collect, categorize, and package offensive
speech for sale to advertisers are not susceptible to the counterspeech
theory because these algorithms are themselves designed to limit access
to speech. Such algorithms tailor the speech that a user sees on social
media without the user affirmatively choosing to limit it themselves or
even knowing exactly how, why, or if the speech they are seeing is
limited. Instead of offering Brandeis's "more speech," the advertising
algorithms offer the same speech over and over, limiting the
marketplace of ideas to one familiar store. This kind of personalized
advertising "serve[s] up a kind of invisible autopropaganda,
indoctrinating us with our own ideas, amplifying our desire for things
that are familiar and leaving us oblivious to the dangers lurking in the
dark territory of the unknown." 43 This practice advances Facebook's
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
37.
See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 400-01 (1969) (upholding the fairness
38.
doctrine as constitutional). But see F.C.C. v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 378
n.12 (1984) (stating that if the FCC showed that the fairness doctrine "[has] the net effect of
reducing rather than enhancing speech," the Court would reconsider Red Lion). The FCC
ultimately repealed the regulations in 1987. See Kathleen Ann Ruane, Fairness Doctrine: History
and Constitutional Issues, Congressional Research Service (July 13, 2011).
See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("If there
39.
be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes
of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.").
SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 36-44.
40.
See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011)
41.
See Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL 21464568,
42.
at *2-3 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003) (holding that Google's PageRank algorithm is a constitutionally
protected opinion).
43.

ELI PARISER, THE FILTER BUBBLE: How THE NEW PERSONALIZED WEB IS CHANGING

WHAT WE READ AND How WE THINK 15 (2011).
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goal to increase user engagement and make placement on the site
attractive to advertisers, 44 but it limits the effectiveness of the
marketplace of ideas. 45
The distortion effect of personalized content is particularly
distressing when algorithms continue to deliver more of the same
content to those who have proven susceptible to speech that incites
hatred. For example, demonstrating a tendency to "like," click, or share
material that dehumanizes refugees or immigrants teaches the
algorithm to continue making similar content available and offer that
interest for sale. 4 6
Algorithms can make the work of moral
disengagement and dehumanization automatic by consistently and
relentlessly reinforcing that distortion of reality. 47
When Facebook sells a "Boosted Post"4 8 to an advertiser, a user
sees the post in her Facebook News Feed. 49 The more one sees a
message repeated in one's News Feed, the more one believes that the
idea is popular and legitimate.5 0 This results in Facebook users seeing
hateful messages validated by repetition without awareness of why
they are selected. The user did not select the post in the first place and
would have no opportunity to affirmatively counter it. Whether one
would want to counter the speech by reading an article with a different
viewpoint or not, one has no opportunity to do so.
The limited exposure chosen by the algorithm prevents
extensive counterspeech from reaching a particular user, reinforcing
pre-existing beliefs rather than allowing users to exchange ideas and
learn over time.5 1 In addition, algorithmic output can mislead viewers
44.
See U.S. SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N, FACEBOOK, INC. FORM 10-Q 41-42 (2018) ("Our
advertising revenue could also be adversely affected by a number of other factors, including:
decreases in user engagement, including time spent on our products; our inability to continue to
.

increase user access to and engagement with our products . .

45.
See Napoli, supra note 36, at 77.
46.
See Angwin, Varner & Tobin, supra note 2.
47.
See PARISER, supra note 43, at 15, 82-83 (discussing the distorting effect of
personalization filters). For a concise explanation of machine learning and how algorithms selflearn, see Solon Barocas et al., Data & Civil Rights: Technology Primer, DATA & SoC'Y RES. INST.
(Oct.
30,
2014),
https://datasociety.net/output/data-civil-rights-technology-primer/
[https://perma.cc/3WZE-42AL].
48.
See Ads & Boosted Posts, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/business/help/
240208966080581 [https://perma.cc/T28T-MZYYJ (last visited Feb. 27, 2019) (A Boosted Post on
Facebook allows a user to create a Facebook advertisement from the post, showing it to an audience
the user targets "to reach new people who are likely interested in [the user's] content but don't
currently follow [the user] on Facebook.").
49.
See id. (explaining how to purchase a boosted post and demonstrating that the post is
organically integrated into news feeds without being labeled as an advertisement).
50.

See Jost VAN DIJCK, THE CULTURE OF CONNECTIVITY: A CRITICAL HISTORY OF SOCIAL

MEDIA 63 (2013); Lavi, supra note 2, at 30.
51.
See VAN DIJCK, supra note 50, at 63, 158 (explaining that what one sees and likes on
social media may shape what one thinks and believes, even more than what one thinks and
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into thinking an idea is more popular than it actually is.52 This kind of
manufactured credibility can easily be manipulated by those who wish
to incite hatred, making the hate speech appear more credible
automatically.
The lack of transparency surrounding personalized content
confines a user to the viewpoint she has already given as input to an
algorithm, destroying the marketplace of ideas and undermining the
Personalization of advertising,
effectiveness of counterspeech.5 3
calculated by an algorithm based on past behavior, ensures that even if
one "clicks around" on different pages based on interest, the world of
links presented to a reader is limited by past behavior. 5 4 The world,
along with one's worldview, becomes more limited instead of broader
due to the limited exposure to and limited effectiveness of
counterspeech.5 5
A Facebook user can, of course, choose to spontaneously initiate
a search for an article about something new that has not been provided
to her based on past behavior. But even entering a term into a Google
search will yield different results for someone familiar with the phrase
than for someone who has never encountered the term before running
the search due to the pervasiveness of personalized content and search
results. 5 6 The effect of this filter bubble makes dehumanizing speech
particularly dangerous because a reader becomes more attached to a
57
worldview by seeing the same view reflected back.
believes shapes what one sees and likes); Kevin Roose, A Mass Murder of, and for, the Internet,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/15/technology/facebook-youtubechristchurch-shooting.html [https://perma.cclEMT2-69UQ] ("[W]e do know that the design of
internet platforms can create and reinforce extremist beliefs. Their recommendation algorithms
often steer users toward edgier content, a loop that results in more time spent on the app, and
more advertising revenue for the company. Their hate speech policies are weakly enforced.").
See Marc Fisher et al., Pizzagate:From Rumor, to Hashtag, to Gunfire in D.C., WASH.
52.
POST (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/pizzagate-from-rumor-to-hashtag-togunfire-in-dc/2016/12/06/4c7def50-bbd4- 1 1e6-94ac3d324840106cstory.html?utm-term=.605c29cb971a [https://perma.cc/XB2C-ZEWP] ("Online, the
more something is retweeted or otherwise shared, the more prominently it appears in social media
and on sites that track 'trending' news. As the bots joined ordinary Twitter users in pushing out
Pizzagate-related rumors, the notion spread like wildfire. Who programmed the bots to focus on
that topic remains unknown.").

See PARISER, supra note 43, at 14-15.
53.
See id. at 16, 114-15.
54.
See AJ Willingham, Study: Facebook Can Actually Make Us More Narrow-Minded,
55.
CNN (Jan. 22, 2017, 1:51 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/22/healthlfacebook-study-narrowminded-trndlindex.html [https://perma.cc/B9NZ-JKKS].
See PARISER, supra note 43, at 112-13 (explaining the beginning of Google's use of
56.
personalized search results).
See VAN DIJCK, supra note 50, at 158; DAVID SUMPTER, OUTNUMBERED: FROM
57.
FACEBOOK AND GOOGLE TO FAKE NEWS AND FILTER-BUBBLES - THE ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL

OUR LIVES 137-42 (2018) (distinguishing an echo chamber from a filter bubble by explaining that
while an echo chamber is affirmatively chosen by a user who only reads material from one
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Complicating matters further, internet companies, such as
Facebook, benefit from readers who engage with content by clicking on
many links and pages.58 Although this incentive could positively
contribute to the marketplace of ideas because consumers can click and
choose from infinite possibilities, it actually undermines the
effectiveness of counterspeech.5 9 Internet companies are incentivized
to design the user experience to encourage fast and shallow clicking,
which leads to shallow reading.60
However, the availability of links does not mandate clicking, of
course, and a reader still has the ability to deliberately search for
conflicting points of view, read them slowly, and contemplate the merits
of the arguments. Slow contemplation and comparative analysis
comports with ideal counterspeech: after contemplation, the true idea
wins the day. In Brandeis's original call for "more speech" instead of
censorship, he clarified that the "more speech" solution required "time
to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the
evil by the processes of education." 61
But this kind of slow
contemplation does not translate to income streams for the many
companies that rely on clicks and data about browsing habits to
generate income. The profitability of quick clicks and the incentive of
internet companies to collect data from multiple sources make speech
that dehumanizes and propagates fear much more dangerous because
the ready availability of distraction discourages the comparative
analysis necessary for ideal counterspeech to be effective. 62 The
business model of companies that use advertising as their main source
of revenue undermines counterspeech, faith in which is one of the key
justifications for broad protections of speech in the United States.
Beyond isolating the advertised message from counterspeech,
Facebook's advertising algorithms transform a user's expression into a

perspective, a filter bubble is created by an algorithm based on searches and browsing history-in
other words, "[e]ach action you make in your web browser is used to decide what to show you
next").
58.
See Nicholas Carr, Is Google Making Us Stupid?, ATLANTIC (July/Aug. 2008),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/07/is-google-making-us-stupid/306868/
[https://perma.cclR6N3-GA6X].
59.
See Napoli, supranote 36, at 77-79.
60.
See PARISER, supranote 43, at 84-85 ("[P]ersonalized filters can upset [the] cognitive
balance between strengthening our existing ideas and acquiring new ones" by "surround[ing] us
with ideas with which we are already familiar" and "remov[ing] from our environment some of the
key prompts that make us want to learn.").
61.
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
62.
See Carr, supra note 58; Willingham, supra note 55. For a discussion of how
personalized content contributes to the diminished ability to distinguish real news from fake news,
see Napoli, supra note 36, at 79, 85. For a discussion of how the psychological effects of repetition
affect credibility, see PARISER, supra note 43, at 189-202.
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consumer interaction in the click economy. 6 3 A post, a like, or
membership in a group is a Facebook user's speech. When Facebook
offers that information for sale to advertisers, Facebook sells the
attention of the Facebook user, which translates into the potential to
64
interact with that user and generate more posts, likes, and comments.
This engagement is then seen by those in the user's social network,
although who sees it and how prominently the post will be displayed
will depend on the ever-changing coding of Facebook's News Feed
algorithm. 65 This interaction with messages further legitimizes them,
amplifying the strength of that message by increasing the number of
times it appears, not only in one user's News Feed, but now as an
66
interaction that can be broadcast to everyone in the user's network.
An interaction that is particularly engaging-generating many likes,
views, clicks, and comments-might be further promoted in the News
Feeds of the user's friends.
III. THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE AND ADVERTISING
ALGORITHMS

The need to regulate Facebook's advertising algorithms is
pressing. Facebook, in response to any limitation on its "speech,"
however, could challenge the law's constitutionality under the First
Amendment. The Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment
provides protection for commercial speech but allows for its regulation
if the regulation meets a rigorous test.6 7 This Part first examines how
the Supreme Court analyzes speech under the First Amendment and
whether advertising algorithms are speech covered by the First
Amendment at all, through outlining the Court's protection of "machine
speech." Second, this Part examines whether Facebook's advertising
algorithms may fit the Court's vacillating definition of commercial
speech.

See Issie Lapowsky, Facebook Alone Didn't Create Trump-The Click Economy Did,
63.
WIRED (Nov. 12, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/11/facebook-alone-didnt-createtrump-click-economy/ [https://perma.cc/2C75-K8RZ].
See WU, supra note 16, at 299.
64.
See SUMPTER, supra note 57, at 138-39. The algorithm can be summarized as follows:
65.
"Visibility = (your interest in newspaper) * (closeness to friend sharing article)." Id.
See Josh Constine, How Facebook News Feed Works, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 6, 2016),
66.
[https://perma.cc/MJ2Khttps://techcrunch.com/2016/09/06/ultimate-guide-to-the-news-feed/
MG2X].
See DEAN K. FUEROGHNE, LAW & ADVERTISING: A GUIDE TO CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES
67.
13 (4th ed. 2017).
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A. Defining Commercial Speech
In order to be protected by the First Amendment, advertising
algorithms must first be considered "speech." 68 Lower court decisions
have protected algorithms such as Google's PageRanks as speech, 69 but
the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue. This Section will
examine whether advertising algorithms should be considered speech

using Tim Wu's proposed functionality test.7 0

1. Are Advertising Algorithms Speech?
At a basic level, advertising algorithms are simply computer
code, programmed to weigh several criteria and produce a result.
Suppose an advertiser expresses to a human employee of a market
research company that she wants to reach an audience interested in
drinking coffee. Under a traditional approach, the market research
employee would be trained in how to find coffee drinkers; her training
would tell her sources to consider and how to evaluate the sources in
order to give the advertiser what she asked for. This might take a few
hours of looking through files and spreadsheets, and then the market
research employee would present to the advertiser a list of people who
have purchased coffee in stores and online, have shared articles about
coffee with their friends, or have used the word "coffee" in posts or photo
captions. In order to expedite that process and consider far more data
faster than a human employee could, Facebook and other online
advertising platforms write computer codes-known as advertising
algorithms-that are intended to automatically produce results. These
algorithms can quickly analyze and process more data than a
traditional approach. 7 ' Facebook then sells access to these results to its
advertisers. 72 Then Facebook decides, using another algorithm, how

68.
See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
69.
See, e.g., E-ventures Worldwide, LLC v. Google, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 3d 1265, 1274 (M.D.
Fla. 2016) ("Google's PageRanks are pure opinions of the website's relevancy to a user's search
query, incapable of being proven true or false."); Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 43839 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL
21464568, at *4-5 (W.D. Okla. 2003).
70.
See Wu, supra note 22, at 1517.
71.
See Will Oremus, Who Controls Your Facebook Feed, SLATE (Jan. 3, 2016),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/cover-story/2016/01/how-facebook-s-news-feedalgorit
hm works.html [https://perma.cc/Q9MN-S49U]; Ben Shaffer, Understanding Facebook Ads
Algorithm, MEDIUM (Apr. 11, 2018), https://medium.com/@benshaffer_83355/understandingfacebook-ads-algorithm-bOdacc46564e [https://perma.cc/C4UA-QNSH].
72.
See WU, supra note 16, at 299-302.
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prominently to feature the coffee advertisement and many other
73
advertisements in the user's interactions on Facebook.
In recent years, lower courts have held that computer code is
speech because it contains information. 74 This definition is problematic
because it covers too much; not every line of computer code that
contains information needs to be, or should be, protected by the First
Amendment. Wu illustrates this with his example of a car alarm
operated by an algorithm: it is information communicated to an
audience, but the noise of a car alarm should not be constitutionally
Wu has proposed a solution to this
protected speech.76
overinclusiveness by using a functionality test to refine whether
computer code is considered speech. 76 Under the proposed analysis, the
First Amendment covers computer code that serves as expressive
speech (a "speech product"), but not computer code that merely
77
Speech that is a
facilitates communication (a "communication tool").

''mere communicative tool," such as a map that is meant to assist a user
with the task of locating a place, is functional and not covered by the
First Amendment.7 8 But as services add more of their own content, that
communication will trend toward being expressive-and therefore
protected-speech.7 9 Some code communicates more like a newspaper
editor-selecting its own content to present to its audience-and
therefore will be protected, while other code communicates more like a
car alarm-performing a communication function-and will not be
protected.8 0
Under Wu's analysis, Facebook's advertising algorithms would
likely be considered expressive speech, because of the extensive
curation and selection of Facebook's own content and data points in
order to serve up users to advertisers and then serve up advertisements
to users. Unlike the car alarm in Wu's example, Facebook's advertising
algorithms perform more like the newspaper editor. To return to the
See Oremus, supra note 71; Shaffer, supra note 71.
73.
See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 449 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating
74.
that computer code can merit First Amendment protection); Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 176
F.3d 1132, 1141 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that source code is expressive for First Amendment
purposes); Kyle Langvardt, The DoctrinalToll of "Informationas Speech", 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 761,
762 (2016) (quoting Justice Kennedy in stating the "rule that information is speech").
See Wu, supra note 22, at 1496.
75.
See id. at 1497.
76.
See id. at 1498.
77.
See id. at 1524, 1530 ("Google is just trying to find what the user wants . . . . [A tool
78.
that] directly serves the user, while [speech] attempts to persuade him."). For a discussion on
recommended tools that rely on data provided by the user, in which the tools are unprotected
because they are just reminding the user of what she already wants, see id. at 1532.
See id. at 1530.
79.
See id. at 1496, 1530.
80.
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market research employee finding coffee drinkers for an advertiser, the
training given to the employee to aid in her finding the sought-after
consumers would be the speech. Facebook determines which data are
collected, creates advertising categories, and offers those categories for
sale or bid."'
Each step of curation weighs toward Facebook's
advertising algorithms being Facebook's own expressive speech. In this
way, Facebook is more than a passive "platform" for third-party
content; in curating users' News Feeds and creating advertisement
categories out of user data, Facebook speaks (expressively), and that
speech is covered by the First Amendment.
Courts have begun to analyze the question of "machine speech"
by considering whether search engine results are protected speech and
have generally held that search results, such as Google's PageRank
results, are protected speech.8 2 The question of whether advertising
algorithms themselves are protected speech is slightly different,
because it requires analyzing the tool instead of what the tool
produces-in other words, whether the PageRank algorithm itself,
considered separately from its search results, is protected speech.
In fact, when analyzing whether search engine results are
protected speech, courts have also touched on the question of whether
the algorithms that create the search results are speech, stating that
"the algorithms themselves were written by human beings, and they
'inherently incorporate the search engine company engineers'
judgments about what material users are most likely to find responsive
to their queries."' 83 In short, one could forcefully argue that:
[V] hat is true for parades and newspaper op-ed pages is at least as true for search
engine output. When search engines select and arrange other materials, and add
the all-important ordering that causes some materials to be displayed first and
others last, they are engaging in fully protected First Amendment expression .
84

Here, advertising algorithms are tools designed to exercise
editorial discretion, selecting some data instead of other data in order
to produce a message, and should also be considered protected speech.

81.
See Angwin, Varner & Tobin, supra note 2.
82.
See, e.g., E-ventures Worldwide, LLC v. Google, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 3d 1265, *16-17
(M.D. Fla. 2016) ("Google's PageRanks are pure opinions of the website's relevancy to a user's
search query, incapable of being proven true or false."); Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d
433, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Kinderstart.com, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), 2007 WL
831806, at *22-24 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007); Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-021457-M, 2003 WL 21464568, at *9-11 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003).
83.
Zhang, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 438-39.
84.
Id. (citations omitted).
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2. Are Advertising Algorithms Commercial Speech?
Determining whether advertising algorithms are speech at all is
only the first step of First Amendment analysis. The second step is
whether advertising algorithms also fall under the category of
commercial speech.
A court's analysis of whether the regulation of speech is
constitutional under the First Amendment depends on whether the
regulation is based on the content of the speech.85 If the regulation is
not based on the content of the speech, the government generally may
regulate the time, place, and manner of speech, as long as they leave
alternative channels of communication open. 86 If the regulation of
speech is based on content, the regulation is generally not permitted,
although the Court has carved out exceptions for certain low-value
categories of speech, including libel, obscene and profane speech,
fighting words, and commercial advertising.8 7
Commercial speech has been somewhat ill-defined by courts,
which have marked the boundaries of commercial speech by saying
what it is not; for example, commercial speech does not include all
speech that is profit motivated or where the speaker is paid to speak to
the audience.8 8 The Supreme Court's definition of what commercial
speech actually entails is somewhat intuitive-namely, speech that
does no more than propose a commercial transaction.8 9 A sign that
advertises goods for a low price is a classic example.9 0 But commercial
speech is not limited to traditional advertisements. For example, the
Supreme Court held that Tupperware parties are commercial speech, 91
and the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a sales
pitch to sell shea butter and incense on a boardwalk is commercial
speech. 92
Under the Central Hudson test, advertising algorithms would
likely also fall under the category of commercial speech. Advertising
algorithms propose a commercial transaction by matching users'
See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975); Police Dep't of
85.
Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
See McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 476-77 (2014).
86.
87.
See Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARv. L. REV. 2166,
2168 (2015) (distinguishing the legal protections of low-value speech and high-value speech).
See Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L.
88.
REV. 627, 638 (1990).
See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376,
89.
385 (1973).
See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
90.
769-70 (1976).
See Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 472-75 (1989).
91.
See Hunt v. City of L.A., 638 F.3d 703, 708, 716 (9th Cir. 2011).
92.
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interests to advertisers. The message, or speech, of the algorithm is to
match user information to the advertiser, targeting users yho are more
likely to accept the advertiser's message and engage in a commercial
transaction by clicking on the advertisement. 93
Moreover, Facebook's advertising algorithms should be
recognized as commercial speech.
Recognizing that advertising
algorithms are speech recognizes Facebook's power over its platform.
Users may decide what they post about themselves to their Facebook
account platforms, but Facebook controls and is responsible for its
algorithms. This only makes sense, given that these algorithms
ultimately produce 99 percent of the company's revenue. 94 To go further
and recognize that Facebook's advertising algorithms are commercial
speech is to distinguish Facebook's speech from the speech of its users
and to afford each kind of speech different constitutional protection.
Facebook's speech can and should be regulated, as Mark Zuckerberg,
other leaders of social media companies, and their trade association
acknowledge. 95 Facebook has long enjoyed its status as an unregulated
media company, claiming double protection by taking advantage of a
law that allows websites to avoid liability for content posted by third
parties but also claiming First Amendment rights to which it is only
entitled if it takes an active, editorial stance and creates its own
"expressive speech." 96 Essentially, Facebook claims that it does not
monitor its network for third party content and is therefore not
responsible for it (known as the "dumb pipes" argument). In other
words, Facebook claims to be more like a mailman who carries mail
(posts, user speech, etc.) but does not read it, and so should not be
responsible for it.9 Recognizing that Facebook's advertising algorithms
are both highly curated and propose a commercial transaction permits
Facebook to seek shelter under the First Amendment, but also specifies

93.
See PittsburghPress, 413 U.S. at 385 (commercial speech "[does] no more than propose
a commercial transaction"). But see Kozinski & Banner, supra note 88, at 638-39 (questioning the
definition of commercial speech).
94.
See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, FACEBOOK, INC. FORM 10-K 50 (2019) (disclosing that
advertising constituted 99 percent of Facebook's revenue for the first nine months of 2018).
95.
See Cecilia Kang, Tech Industry Pursues a Federal Privacy Law, on Its Own Terms,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/26/technology/tech-industryfederal-privacy-law.html [https://perma.cc/3F2F-WQYS]; Leading Tech Group Unveils Framework
to Advance Consumer Privacy, INFO. TECH. INDUS.
COUNCIL (Oct.
22,
2018),
https://www.itic.org/news-events/news-releases/leading-tech-group-unveils-framework-to-

advance-consumer-privacy [https://perma.cc/856Z-WSNE]; Mark Zuckerberg in His Own Words:
The CNN Interview, supra note 1.
96.
See Anne Halsey, ISPs Want to Have Their First Amendment Cake and Eat It Too,
PUB. KNOWLEDGE (Aug. 20, 2010), https://www.publicknowledge.org/news-blog/blogs/isps-wanthave-their-first-amendment-cake-and [https://perma.cc/9ZXN-7T4Z].
97.
Id.
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that its advertising algorithms are its own speech, and it is responsible
for what those algorithms do. Facebook's complex algorithmic decision
makers are far from "dumb pipes" and should not receive double-and
seemingly paradoxical-protection.
Recognizing that Facebook's advertising algorithms are
commercial speech also supports a public shift in how Facebook is
viewed. 98 When a user speaks through a Facebook post, Facebook has
9 9 Facebook is much
ultimate control in whether that speech is heard.
more than a free tool for building social connections and communicating
freely with friends and family. Rather, it is a private company that sells
the data it collects to advertisers.1 0 0 Facebook's speech, like the speech
of advertisers, can and should be regulated in order to protect
consumers.
B. The Central Hudson Test
Since advertising algorithms fit the definition of commercial
speech, one must then examine whether they receive absolute First
Amendment protection or whether they may be regulated by the
01
government. This section will discuss the Central Hudson test and
distinguish its analysis from how courts determine whether
noncommercial speech is protected.
In Central Hudson, a state law banned all advertising that
"promote[s] the use of electricity." 10 2 The Court held that the total ban

See Kelly Wynne, Facebook Scandals and DecliningPopularityHas Knocked $31B off
98.
AM),
Mark Zuckerberg's Fortune This Year: Report, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 18, 2018, 10:11
3
https://www.newsweek.com/facebooks-scandals-and-declining-popularity-has-knocked- 1b-markzuckerbergs-1221018 [https://perma.cc/98Y9-LP6J].
See Angwin, Varner & Tobin, supra note 2; Kalev Leetaru, Has Social Media Killed
99.
PM),
10:56
2016,
31,
(Oct.
FORBES
Speech?,
Free
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kalevleetarul2016/10/31/has-social-media-killed-freespeechl#7ce2ac4446b1 [https://perma.cclN9QA-5GQX] (comparing Facebook's speech standards to
free speech regimes in the United States and other countries).
See Drew Harwell, Facebook, Longtime Friendof Data Brokers, Becomes Their Stiffest
100.
Competition, WASH. POST (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.cominews/theswitch/wp/2018/0 3/29/facebook -longtime-friend-of-data-brokers-becomes-their-stiffe stcompetition/?noredirect=on&utmterm=.8006b6e8eee5 [https://perma.cclF3UN-7GHJ]. Facebook
also sells data to data brokers, who can then appropriate the data for their own purposes or sell it
to third parties. See id.; Chris Morran, Facebook Is Now Selling Your Web-Browsing Data to
AM),
7:52
2014,
12,
(June
CONSUMERIST
Advertisers,
https://consumerist.com/2014/06/12/facebook-is-now-selling-your-web-browsing-data-toadvertisers/ [https://perma.cclV3TB-5238].
See generally Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
101.
557 (1980).
Id. at 558-59, 568.
102.
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was unconstitutional under the First Amendment, using criteria that
courts still use in commercial speech cases. 10 3
The Central Hudson test lays out a list of criteria for
determining whether government regulation of commercial speech is
constitutional: (1) whether the expression is protected by the First
Amendment (information that is unlawful or misleading is not
protected), (2) whether the government has a substantial interest in
regulating the speech, (3) whether regulation directly advances the
asserted government interest, and (4) whether the regulation is more
extensive than necessary to serve that interest.1 04
The Court subsequently relaxed two of the Central Hudson
criteria in Milavetz v. United States10 5 and Board of Trustees v. Fox.106
In Milavetz, the Court expounded on the third criterion, whether the
regulation directly advances the government interest asserted,
upholding bankruptcy disclosure requirements because they were
"reasonably related to the [government's] interest in preventing
deception to consumers," relaxing the standard from "directly advance"
to "reasonably related." 107 In addition, the fourth criterion was relaxed
in Board of Trustees v. Fox, changing the fourth criterion from not "more
extensive than necessary" to "reasonable fit."108

IV. REGULATION OF ADVERTISING ALGORITHMS CAN SURVIVE FIRST
AMENDMENT SCRUTINY THROUGH THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH
DOCTRINE

A. RegulatingAdvertising Algorithms Under the Commercial Speech
Doctrine
Regulation of Facebook's advertising algorithms can and should
be designed to survive the Central Hudson commercial speech test with
its more contemporary modifications.109
Lawmakers
should
particularly focus on tailoring the law to "reasonably fit" the substantial
government interest in limiting the artificial effects of amplification of
hate speech, as well as the distortion of the marketplace of ideas
through insulating the message from counterspeech.
103.
Id. at 566, 571; see, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 499-513
(1996); Retail Dig. Network, LLC v. Prieto, 861 F.3d 839, 844 (9th Cir. 2017); IMS Health Inc. v.
Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263, 281-82 (2d Cir. 2010).
104.
See Central Hudson Gas & Electric, 447 U.S. at 566.
105.
See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 249 (2010).
106.
See Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989).
107.
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 249-50.
108.
Board of Trustees of State University of N.Y., 492 U.S. at 480-81.
109.
See id.; Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 249-50.
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The regulation should focus on two areas: the categories that
advertisers can bid on and limitations on how Facebook can match a
user to an advertiser based on those interests. First, it should regulate
the advertisement categories made available for sale, disallowing the
targeting of interest in racism and violence. Second, it should regulate
how users are matched to their interests, mandating that Facebook
either make interest-based advertising opt in instead of opt out, or
alternatively, allow users to pay a fee to opt out of interest-based
advertising entirely. 110 However, any law that regulates advertising
algorithms need not put a blanket prohibition on targeting Facebook
users who express interest in, for example, anti-Semitism. Facebook
could instead offer free advertisements to nonprofit organizations that
offer support to formerly racist individuals who wish to leave hatebased communities.'
The spirit of the law should be to prevent the spread of racism
and hate speech that is isolated from any counter messages, allowing
users to be targeted by hate-based interests only if there is a human
12
review component to the content of the message.1 If the proposed law
could tailor itself to allow a nonprofit organization to offer support to
someone with a demonstrated interest in hate speech, but not allow
advertisements in furtherance of hatred, it would be both more likely to
reduce the harm of selling racist or violent advertisement categories
and more likely to survive the narrowly tailored prong of Central
Hudson.
This kind of categorical advertising regulation is certainly
achievable and has been effective in regulating how cigarettes and
alcohol are advertised. 113 The only difference is that the technology
used to target advertisers' audience has been automated, and therefore
But
Facebook will have to do more to responsibly control it.
technological change and burden to the commercial interest are not

See How Does Facebook Decide Which Ads to Show Me and How Can I Control the Ads
110.
64 7
153813?helpref-related
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FACEBOOK,
See?,
I
2019).
27,
Feb.
[https://perma.cc/2SXX-9LFS] (last visited
See, e.g., LIFE AFTER HATE, https://www.1ifeafterhate.org/ [https://perma.cc/ALU8111.
5ZV3] (last visited Feb. 27, 2019). Facebook actually began directing users who searched for terms
related to white supremacy to Life After Hate in April 2019. See Sasha Ingber, Facebook Bans
White Nationalism and Separatism Content from Its Platforms, NPR (Mar. 27, 2019, 4:33 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2019/03/27/707258353/facebook-bans-white-nationalism-and-separatismcontent-from-its-platforms [https://perma.cc/7VGJ-UV5R].
See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 252-53 (discussing how limiting the
112.
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application bankruptcy requirements to professionals who offer bankruptcy-related services and
who use keywords like "the benefits of bankruptcy" and "excessive debt" made the law reasonably
related to the government interest).
See FUEROGHNE, supra note 67, at 338-53.
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considered in the Central Hudson test and do not change the
government's substantial interest in regulating advertising algorithms.
B. Passingthe Central Hudson Test
In applying Central Hudson to this proposed regulation, the first
step is determining whether the First Amendment protects the
expression. As discussed in Part III, Facebook's advertising algorithms
are protected speech because they are expressive speech that Facebook
designs, making editorial decisions, but they are not illegal or
misleading.
The government has a substantial interest in regulating the
speech. 114 Unlike the publication of a price list, as was at issue in 44
Liquor Mart v. Rhode Island,115 the algorithm here is not publishing
information that the public needs to make an informed decision about
purchasing goods or services.1 16 The algorithm does not publish any
information to users or to advertisers, but rather invisibly matches
interests and users without informing either party to the transaction of
exactly how they were matched. 117 In addition, allowing Facebook to
advertise based on categories such as "Jew hater" harms society by
insulating hateful messages from counterspeech while amplifying the
hateful message, as discussed above in Part II.
Under the third criterion of the CentralHudson test, the means
must be reasonably related to the asserted government interest in
regulating the advertising algorithm.11 8 A law that passes scrutiny
should follow the guidance offered in Milavetz, where bankruptcy
disclosure requirements were upheld.1 19 The Court found that the
disclosure requirements were "reasonably related to the [government's]
interest in preventing deception to consumers" because the disclosure
requirement only applied to "professionals who offer bankruptcyrelated services to consumer debtors" and only applied to
advertisements pertaining to keywords like "the benefits of
bankruptcy." 120 Here, the regulation should be limited only to the
categories that advertisers can bid on (not, for example, limiting the
data Facebook can collect) and to the method of matching users to
114.

See supra Part I.

115.
See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489-90 (1996).
116.
See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
765-66 (1976) (reasoning that the First Amendment protects pricing information due to citizens'
need for information to make informed economic decisions).
117.
See Angwin, Varner & Tobin, supra note 2.
118.
See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 252-53 (2010).
119.
See id. at 249-53.
120.
Id. at 230, 232, 252.
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advertisers, mandating a stage of human review in the process that will
prevent the restricted categories from being created automatically by
algorithm.
The fourth criterion, whether the regulation is more extensive
than necessary to serve the government interest, was relaxed in Board
of Trustees v. Fox,12 1 which changed the test from least restrictive
means to "reasonable fit."1 2 2 A statute could likely survive scrutiny if it
tailored its restriction to match the harm, but again, this would depend
on how the law was worded.
The current First Amendment jurisprudence is well suited to
adapt to advances in technology speech. However, courts should
analyze computer code as speech more carefully than simply
designating it as "information" and thus protected. This would allow
Congress more leeway in regulating the negative consequences of
Facebook's as-yet unchecked authority in designing advertising
algorithms.
V. CONCLUSION: SOCIAL NETWORKS AS COMMUNITY, ADVERTISING
ALGORITHMS AS COMMERCE

Facebook has recently undertaken various changes to its policies
in response to media attention and in order to avoid even the "right"
regulation. 12 3 But changing just enough to avoid scrutiny will not halt
the negative effects of an unchecked Facebook. Recognizing that
Facebook speaks through its algorithms and that its speech proposes a
commercial transaction will redefine the relationship between
Facebook, its users, and potential users. Using the commercial speech
designation subverts a popular conception of Facebook that sees all of
Facebook as a community instead of a commercial space and allows its
algorithms to be regulated in a way that rightly separates advertising
and commercial speech from the Facebook community of user speech.
Limits on advertising algorithms will maintain the protection of
Facebook as a community while regulating Facebook as commerce.
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